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Nelson and Stavridis: The Accidental Admiral: A Sailor Takes Command at NATO

pages of endnotes. Uniquely, the book
also develops practical recommendations for implementing the strategy
with serious attention to timelines and
regional nuances. Where Layne’s Peace
of Illusions traces historical failings of
the hegemonic approach, Restraint is
a timely, fleshed-out policy proposal.
Ultimately, many policy makers will never get past page 1, where Posen defines
American national security interests as
the traditional sovereignty, safety, territory, and international power position.
Threats to those are modest and Posen
makes a compelling case they are best
managed through limited overseas commitments. On the other hand, many in
Washington believe American hegemony
—euphemized as “leadership”—is in
and of itself a fundamental interest, and
that no economic and physical risks are
acceptable. That one televised beheading
five thousand miles away can so alarm
America suggests this will not change
soon. For those willing to think critically about America’s security needs,
however, Restraint offers a deeply logical
challenge and a thoughtful blueprint.
DAVID T. BURBACH

Stavridis, James G. The Accidental Admiral: A
Sailor Takes Command at NATO. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2014. 288pp. $32.95

In the early days of the Second World
War, General Eisenhower, the first
Supreme Allied Commander of Europe,
struggled to keep the alliance together.
One of the more interesting anecdotes
about this struggle is when he almost
fired a member of his staff because the
officer was, shall we say, culturally insensitive. The story goes that an American
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officer, a colonel on Eisenhower’s staff,
insulted a British officer by calling him
a British bastard. Ike wasn’t pleased.
Ike threatened to bust him down to
private. Being a bastard, he said, was not
a national characteristic. All were equal
in the eyes of the allies. But admittedly,
handling NATO has not gotten any
easier over the years. Secretary Gates,
prior to his departure, had some choice
words for the alliance, urging more
NATO members to meet the required 2
percent of their GDP on defense spending. America, he noted, continues to
pick up the slack—from Afghanistan
to Libya. Yet the alliance remains.
Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.),
most recently Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and
commander of U.S. European Command (EUCOM), and unofficially, the
Navy’s advocate of the well-known
John Adams quotation—“Let us
tenderly and kindly cherish, therefore
the means of knowledge. Let us dare
to read, think, speak and write”—has
written an enjoyable memoir of his
time in Eisenhower’s old chair.
Stavridis’s memoir stays away from criticism of U.S. officials and discussions of
contentious closed-door meetings. This
is in contrast to two other high-profile,
former administration officials’ memoirs
—those of Ambassador Christopher Hill
and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
—which were published around the
same time to much hoopla. While
Stavridis was dual hatted as SACEUR
and EUCOM his reputation around the
headquarters was one of civility and
intelligence, certainly not a bad combination. Stavridis says he wants to show
the reader not what happened during his
four years, but rather why it happened.
He proceeds to take the reader on a tour
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of challenges: from the toppling of Qadhafi to the civil war in Syria, Israeli security, a resurgent Russia, the Balkans, and
finally, of course, Afghanistan. Thus the
first few chapters are a whirlwind of individuals, meetings, and events. Among
all this, he often pauses within chapters
to highlight some of the more important
senior military and political officials
that make up the NATO alliance.
Stavridis spends considerable time
in these early chapters setting up the
facts—stating what happened—and
then trying to balance it against why
it happened and what he learned from
it. The first part of the book, however,
feels rushed and compressed, and even
in his best efforts the balance tilts
toward more numbers and facts and
away from a deep exploration of the
why. If there was one weakness, this is
it. You are left wanting more discussion on how the policy was shaped
in Washington and in Brussels. What
was the dialogue during these many
meetings? And why was it persuasive?
The second part of the book shines.
Here he discusses leadership, strategic
planning, innovation, and strategic
communication. All of these chapters
are excellent and well worth the price of
the book. In one chapter, Stavridis talks
about the actions that led to Generals
McChrystal’s and Petraeus’s resignations—and his own stumbles. It is here
he almost passes the George Orwell test.
Orwell once said, “Autobiography is only
to be trusted when it reveals something
disgraceful. A man who gives a good
account of himself is probably lying,
since any life when viewed from the
inside is simply a series of defeats.” And
for Stravridis it is not all good. Stavridis
explains that he was nominated to be
the Chief of Naval Operations, following
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what was, by many accounts, a successful tour as the supreme allied commander. This was not to be. He describes,
plainly, that some of his official travel
was not properly paid for, and a single
trip was deemed questionable by the
inspector general. He accepted responsibility for his and his staff ’s mistakes,
and made reparations. Although he was
cleared by the Secretary of the Navy
from any wrongdoing, the long investigation was enough to complicate the
political winds that are Washington, and
the Secretary of Defense had to remove
his nomination. While certainly not rising to Orwell’s definition of disgraceful,
nonetheless, it was not his shining hour.
For this reader, the stories of his days
commanding USS Barry, beautifully
captured in his book Destroyer Captain,
remain my favorite. Its style, written in
a journalist’s hand, is intimate and moving—a man that loves the sea yet knows
he is human and only can go as far as his
crew takes him. Still, his new memoir
is a refreshing dose of honesty, intelligence, and reflection—much needed
in today’s Navy and tomorrow’s leaders.
CHRISTOPHER NELSON

Winklareth, Robert J. The Battle of the Denmark
Strait: A Critical Analysis of the Bismarck’s Singular Triumph. Havertown, Pa.: Casemate Publishers, 2012. 336pp. $32.95

From Johnny Horton’s 1960 ballad
“Sink the Bismarck” to James Cameron’s
Expedition Bismarck for the Discovery
Channel in 2002, the sole sortie of the
German battleship in May 1941 has
held the attention of both the general
public and naval historians. The latter
mainly concentrate on the destruction of
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